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Life as Constraint and as Challenge:
Bergson, Canguilhem and the Perplexity of Vitalism

I. On the “Exigency” of Life

	In his essay “Aspects of Vitalism” (1947), which is later published in La connaissance de la vie (1965), Georges Canguilhem defines vitalism in this way:

“Vitalism is the expression of the confidence the living being has in life, of the self-identity of life within the living human being conscious of living. We can thus suggest that vitalism translates a permanent exigency [exigence] of life in the living, the self-identity of life immanent to the living. This explains one of the characteristics that mechanistic biologists and rationalist philosophers criticize in vitalism: its nebulousness and its vagueness. If vitalism is above all an exigency, it is normal that it would have some trouble formulating itself in terms of determinations.”​[1]​

“Exigence” this is the French word that Canguilhem introduces to describe the meaning of life that vitalism can offer to us, to our living human being. What does it mean by speaking of the “exigency” of life? In fact, the French word exigence has caused some troubles in English translation. It seems not easy to find a same English word to translate the meaning of this French word exigence. Although the English translator uses the word “exigency” in the translation, it cannot fully express the word exigence in a comprehensive and accurate meaning. The word “exigency” in English usually refers to some difficulties in a crisis that cause some urgent demands to people who live in this critical moment. But it is not enough to understand the meaning that Canguilhem makes use of the word exigence with respect to vitalism. Instead of this translation “exigency”, the other possibilities to translate the word include need, requirement, demand or imperative.​[2]​ Above all, we should not forget that all of these interpretations basically have ethical implications: there is a requirement of life which is presented in the living being that needs to be completed. Vitalism has to convey this exigence of life to us, so to speak, a constraint and a challenge of life.​[3]​ 

	What exactly is this “requirement” that Canguilhem intends to convey about the nature of life? Does it refer to something which has teleological meaning? Is life inherently given a purpose or finality that it is forced to achieve and to complete in itself? Apparently, we can have an immediate answer from the second part of this sentence: “the self-identity of life immanent to the living”. It is the problem of the identity of life that arouses criticism on the part of mechanists and rationalists, regarding the ambiguous nature of vitalism that does not fit any determinations. In order to further clarify the question, Canguilhem compares the attitude of vitalism with the one of mechanism on the explanation of exigence. Then he concludes that vitalism is “an exigency rather than a method and a morality rather than a theory”​[4]​. Not only life bears its exigence, even vitalism also takes on the same exigence as the one that is out of the nature of life. Life and vitalism are identical to each other. Hereafter, Canguilhem continues to use exigence again in 7 times in all in the same article.​[5]​ At the end of this article, Canguilhem mentions that vitalism is an exigency rather than a doctrine that explains the vitality of life as a “spontaneity” and “creation” of life. From the exigence of life to the exigence of vitalism, thus far we can understand that life is something sui generis that is irreducible to other things else but only identical with its own in the living being; it tends to creates itself spontaneously without any control from the external forces.

What Canguilhem has asked on the exigence of life is incontestably led to the question about the concept of life: whether ‘life’ can be specifically articulated as a category which is irreducible to physical and chemical phenomena like any others. In fact, the concept of life is always tied to the ambiguous and imprecise understanding of vitalism. Although the use of the term ‘vitalism’ has never been given a definite position in history, it is often disdained as a prejudicial term for describing the beliefs of pseudo-sciences or marginal sciences. Traditionally, vitalism constantly holds that there is a sharp distinction between life and matter which is taken to set against a reductive tendency of mechanistic and materialistic theory of life in the histories of science and philosophy. For example, in Vocabularie technique et critique de la philosophie edited by André Lalande at the beginning of twentieth century, vitalism is defined as “the phenomena of life possesses the characters sui generis, by which they radically differ from physical and chemical phenomena, and also manifest the existence of a ‘vital force’ irreducible to the forces of inert matter.”​[6]​ The opposition of vitalism to mechanism and materialism is based on a distinction between life and matter in a sense that there are two different existences from two different substances. In other words, life is a single and unique substance or principle, such as ‘vital force’ or ‘vital principle,’ which is different from non-living or inert matter. It exists in different order and follows different laws other than the material ones. It is distinguished from matter and also from the material and empirical world. Life has its metaphysical essence of itself. In other words, both life and matter have their own substances and identities respectively. 

	It is clearly to find that the idea of traditional vitalism is not compatible with the meaning of exigence as we have described above. In Canguilhem’s view, the exigence of life that vitalism conveys in the living beings, regarding its constraint and challenge, should be accounted for a creation of vital phenomena. In other words, life has a creative power to transform itself and to transform matter as well. In other words, life is not a distinct substance like ‘vital force’ or ‘vital principle’ but it is rather a spontaneity or a creative power of living forms. The exigence of life must be the ‘creation of life’. It is at this point that we can understand why life or vitalism in the creation always has a difficulty of determining itself. To some extent, it is not exaggerated to imagine that Canguilhem’s exigence of life can find a resonance in philosophy of Henri Bergson. In fact, there are a series of correlations and comparisons between Bergson and Canguilhem on the philosophy of life which goes beyond Foucault’s ideas that merely ends up in defining them as being anti-phenomenological, although they are situated in different positions respectively, a philosophy of experience and a philosophy of the concept.​[7]​ For example, Bergson mentions the exigence of life in Creative Evolution (1907): “The impetus of life, of which we are speaking, consists in a need of creation.”​[8]​ The impetus of life is élan vital which proceeds from itself to inscribe different living forms on matter in order to satisfy the need of creation in the evolution of life. It is élan vital that expresses the exigence of life which enables creation and evolution to be compatible with one another. It is also this creation of the élan vital which is led in relation to the exigence of life that propels one to have a correlative reading of Bergson and Canguilhem on the problem of vitalism. In this case, this paper will go through several discussions: 1) Bergson and Canguilhem on the perplexity of vitalism in its relation to the concept of life; 2) the question on the exigence of life in their different philosophical concerns; 3) two different approaches on philosophy of life: Bergson tactically makes use of vitalism as a step towards the concept of life in the spiritualistic tradition​[9]​ while Canguilhem reinserts vitalism into the materialistic tradition.

   
II. Bergson on Vitalism and Creativity

	It is true that vitalism is always controversially linked to Bergson for his invention of a notion of ‘élan vital’ with respect to the rise of philosophy of life in France at the beginning of twentieth century. The notion of élan vital, which is originally used in L’évolution créatrice, is central to Bergson’s philosophy of life, defining ‘life’ as a ‘vital impetus’ which continuously acts on matter for the creation of vital phenomena and also for the opposition to matter. There is no surprise to see that the term ‘vitalism’ is put on Bergson’s philosophy of life. However, one should be careful about describing Bergson’s philosophy of life as vitalism or not. In order to distinguish Bergson from any vitalistic influence, at least, there are two main reasons given by the opponents that are worth to be carefully considered.​[10]​ First, Bergson has never privileged ‘life’ as the sole concern in his philosophy from which all other notions can be deduced. There could be a philosophy of life extracted from Bergson’s philosophy. But this does not mean that Bergson’s philosophy as a whole is only dedicated to a philosophy of life without having developed the other concerns. The primary and ultimate concern of Bergson in his philosophy is the notion of time, namely “duration” which is introduced to understand the change of life (psychological and biological) and that of the world. The philosophy of life should be subjected to this notion of duration. Second, Bergson has never pursued ‘vital principle’ as a singular, ultimate, supreme, preexistent and overarching principle to explain the vital phenomena of life as if it were the same case in a traditional form of vitalism as Georges Canguilhem has described, such as Paul-Joseph Barthez’s ‘vital principle’, Xavier Bichat’s ‘vital force’, Hans Driesch’s ‘entelechy’ and Constantin von Monakow’s ‘hormé’.​[11]​All these attempts of converting life as the reified principle would beg the question and it would follow by admitting a metaphysical presumption that “life is given”. But this is not Bergson’s position: life is not something essentially given as a metaphysical idea which is posited to sustain and verify the other philosophical notions in Bergson’s philosophy.

In fact, for those who are against the association of Bergson’s philosophy with vitalism, their arguments usually come from a resistance to Bergson’s dualism in proposing an opposition between life and matter at the level of substances. ​[12]​ However, Bergson has never stood for such this dualistic position. If one suggests that vitalism maintains the view of opposition between life and matter at the level of substance, referring to a triumphalism of life over matter and an antagonism of life towards reason, then Bergson’s philosophy of life should be hardly submitted to this vitalistic tradition. Since Bergson’s account of life and matter are consisted in two different tendencies instead of two different substantial entities, his philosophy of life does not fit into vitalism in a conventional sense. However, if one agrees that vitalism is a theory of life to introduce an idea of ‘vital impetus’ as an alternative to the mechanistic view on understanding a transformation from inert matter to organized matter, to perceive life not as a completed reality but as an effect of the process of creative evolution, to reconsider the distinction between life and matter without being confined to a substantial term, and also if one pays attention to a Bergson’s words about the definition of life as “a tendency to act upon inert matter,”(CE96/EC97) then there is no reason for anyone of us to exclude Bergson from an union to vitalism. 

Obviously, Bergson’s philosophy of life is vitalistic in inspiration indeed. Vitalism can be conceivably attributed to Bergson’s philosophy only if the élan vital is not reified as a thing or a substance which is determinedly postulated and also reached beyond or independent of the scope of our experience at all. The reality of élan vital must be tied up to the temporal experience that can prohibit itself from being identified as any actual reality in nature. This temporal experience coincides with Bergson’s main concern of ‘duration’. Paola Marrati claims that “Bergson’s vitalism is thus a vitalism of time: the ‘mysterious’ power of life, the élan vital, is nothing but the power of time.”​[13]​ It is in the evolution of life that time unfolds its act of power on matter: “Wherever anything lives, there is, open somewhere, a register in which time is being inscribed.” (CE16/EC16) ​[14]​ Above all, vitalism in Bergson’s philosophy must be apparently presented in a “philosophy of life” while the élan vital must be derived from duration.​[15]​ In other words, the vitalistic reading of Bergson’s philosophy is allowable only if one can see the attribution of his philosophy of life to an effort of thinking in duration.​[16]​ No doubt the challenge of Bergsonism is that we must think in terms of duration.​[17]​ 
	Now the question is no longer focused on whether Bergson is vitalist or not. But it is shifted to question about what kind of vitalism that we can reach and also we can derive from Bergson’s philosophy of life. First of all, let us going to see how Bergson rejects a validity of vitalism in constituting a new theory of life along with his denial of its compatibility with the truth of finalism. Then we move further to explore the role of élan vital in creative evolution. In the first chapter of L’évolution créatrice, Bergson apparently rejects the positions of finalism and mechanism which are traditionally taken by evolutionist theories for explaining the idea of evolution as a transformation of life. Both of them presuppose that “all is given” in evolution. The succession of species and the emergence of novelty are merely typified as the sheer appearances behind which there is a mechanical or teleological program. As a result, the process of evolution is submitted to a sort of determinism according to which nothing is newly created. Since everything is given, there is nothing unforeseen, and there is no creation in life. Both mechanism and finalism are the abstraction of human intellect that produces the ready-made forms to understand the evolution of life for the practical use. They have misconceived, ignored, and even negated the effect of time as duration in life.

Basically, most of the finalists hold that evolution is led by the telos which is like an intelligence agent through which life is progressively driven towards a realization of certain preexisting model in different living forms of beings at the end of the history of life. As such, Bergson carefully distinguishes vitalistic finalism from Leibnizian finalism. Leibnizian finalism is “an extreme form” of finalism which assumes that “things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged” while vitalistic finalism pursues a realization of ‘vital principle’ in an individuality.​[18]​ The vital principle is an internal one that is operative in an individual living being which is independent of any physical and chemical laws. It functions as a final cause that retains in each individual being for actualizing the work of organization. This vital principle requires the support of a completed individuality: “each being is made for itself, all its parts conspire for the greatest good of the whole and are intelligently organized in view of that end.”​[19]​ For the finalists, vitalistic theories can provide a notion of individuality which is developed from the work of vital principle. By contrast, Bergson refutes such a view that this completed and independent individuality does not actually exist at all from which we can have a definite notion of an individual organism that can be taken as a criterion to make a difference between the whole and the individual. There is no completed individual being absolutely and totally cutting off from the whole nature of species where the vital principle can have its own function. It is a process of individuation instead of the perfection of individuality.​[20]​ In reality, the individuality can never be fixed permanently since life has its vital properties. These vital properties are never realized as such the completed realities because they always undergo changes in the incomplete process of creation and they exist in the form of tendencies.​[21]​ If we cannot determinedly locate where it is the beginning and the end of an individuality owing to the effects of these vital properties, then the vital principle is futile there, and its operation and influence in the continuity between an individual to the others would become a doubt.​[22]​

It is undoubtedly to find that the problem of individuality is inseparable from the notion of vitality. If vitality is conceived as a tendency rather than a substance, then individuality is a product of a process of individuation instead of a preexistent model. Bergson moves further to reconstruct the notion of vitality by purging it from the ‘vital principle’ in the form of finality. For Bergson, the failure of vitalism to account for the finalism is caused by the argument of vital principle for finality which is relied on a completed individuality while that is short of the understating of life as a common origin to all living being. In this case, “the ‘vital principle’ may indeed not explain much, but it is at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us of this occasionally, while mechanism invites us to ignore that ignorance.”​[23]​ Certainly, the importance of vital principle in its explanation of life is nothing more than telling us the limitation of mechanism in its reductive tendency of living matter to inert matter. ​[24]​ But this does not decline any vitalistic influences in Bergson’s reconstruction of finality in which the new idea of finality is no longer confined to the individuality of the living being. ​[25]​ The new finality does not aim at reaching the final harmony at the end of evolution; it is rather an ‘inverted finality’ which is posited at the origin of life, so to speak, ‘the unity of life’. This unity of life “is derived from a vis a tergo: it is given at the start as an impulsion, not placed at the end as an attraction.”​[26]​ It “includes the whole of life in a single indivisible embrace”, namely, a “life common to all the living being” that “forms a single whole” “which co-ordinates not only the parts of an organism with the organism itself, but also each living being with the collective whole of all others.”​[27]​ This unity of life is pushed to move forward by the élan which moves “outside and above the organic world”.​[28]​ The élan is externalized beyond all the organizational levels in evolution instead of internally retaining in the body of each individual living being.​[29]​ In short, the élan is introduced to link up with the vital in order to replace the notion of the telos. 

	If there is a Bergsonian vitalism, it must be the one developed on the basis of the élan vital. The élan vital is not a substance of force but it is rather an image of impetus which is metaphorically introduced to explore how life organizes different forms of matter in duration.​[30]​ Certainly, the élan vital is a power of duration that acts like a tendency which is inscribed on matter and its explosive force overflows into the divergence of life. But life does not act without any limitation. At least, life is required to overcome a resisting force from matter that divides the vital impetus into the divergent lines of evolution. While life acts on matter, the living being is formed that endures in which they undergo a process of change. ​[31]​ This change is an organizing process of the development and aging of life in connection with duration.​[32]​ Life in such a changing process inserts itself into matter in order to create new forms and new habits, to evolve and to become the other. This is the creation of the new and the unforeseeable forms of the living beings. For Bergson, life proceeds itself from a need [exigence] of creation:

“The impetus of life, of which we are speaking, consists in a need [exigence] of creation. It cannot create absolutely, because it is confronted with matter, that is to say, with the movement that is the inverse of its own. But it seizes upon this matter, which is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty.”​[33]​

Life is consisted in a need of creation. It creates freely but not unconditionally. It creates in its overcoming the constraint from matter, with an inverse movement of matter to creation. Life and matter are two different opposite movements of ‘ascent’ and ‘descent’ in the universe. From the amoeba to the human being, life is the same effort to struggle against the repetition and necessity of matter, against the fall into the torpor of matter in order to create the novelty which is not determined in advance. But the work of creation should not be confused with the realization of certain predetermined possibilities or the arrangement of material elements according to certain preexisting models. Creation takes place by the élan vital in its actualization of the immensity of virtualities. The immensity of virtualities which is enfolded in the vital impetus differentiates into multiple forms of living beings in the encounter with matter. It is differentiation but not duplication of life. For duplication, it is the possible to resemble the real, to imitate the real in the past. For differentiation, it is the virtual that carries the past along with the present in the creation of the living forms of life. Creation is neither understood as creatio ex nihilo nor the resemblance of the copy to the ideal origin. Instead, it is the differentiation of life that contains continuity and heterogeneity at the same time.

	Although the creation of vital impetus takes place within the inverse movement of matter, it is a movement to introduce a sort of indetermination and liberty into matter. Creation is presented in the living being as a capability to choose freely, since everything that lives must be conscious of itself. Life in consciousness is regarded as a psychological existence proper to the character of duration. It is a free choice associated with a spontaneous act of consciousness which is not something subjective or individualized: “consciousness is coextensive with life.”​[34]​ There is no consciousness without life and no life without consciousness. Creation must come from a conscious life. The need of creation is the freedom of choice in terms of the divergent lines of evolution: “The living being chooses or tends to choose. Its role is to create.”​[35]​ In other words, creation is a process to wake up consciousness in its connection with life: “this consciousness, which is a need of creation, is made manifest to itself only where creation is possible. It lies dormant when life is condemned to automatism; it wakens as soon as the possibility of a choice is restored.”​[36]​ There is no pure life to exist without being conscious of the need of creation. Life is conceivable only in corresponding with an evolutionary creation that prevents life from falling into a dormant status of automatism by repetitiously wakening it up in the act of choice.
III. Canguilhem on Mechanism and Normativity

It is important to notice that Bergson to a certain extent has played a role in Canguilhem’s philosophy of life. In Canguilhem’s view, Bergsonism is a philosophical heritage that signifies the crisis and return of “biological philosophy” in France compared with philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie) in Germany. Since biological philosophy was neglected from Descartes to Sartre according to Canguilhem,​[37]​  Bergson’s philosophy of life has made a breakthrough by giving “the first surprise” to French philosophy with the publication of Creative Evolution in 1907.​[38]​ In fact, the exception of Bergson has explicated that there is an indifferent attitude to the biological interest in relation to philosophy which existed for a long time in the history of French philosophy.​[39]​ Such indifference can be traced back to the mechanization of life which is in line with the rationalist tradition of Cartesian philosophy that has neglected the originality of life by assimilating the living beings to mechanical and material objects. Cartesian philosophy is finally accused of depriving “life” of its metaphysical originality​[40]​. On the contrary, Bergsonism is an interruption into this rationalistic tradition by restoring a metaphysical perspective in the understanding of life: “philosophy should create a new perspective in front of the vital fact”.​[41]​ Such a new perspective is required “to inscribe the mechanical within the organic,” “to inscribe the history of mechanism in the history of life”. ​[42]​

The problem of mechanism implies a problem with the identity of life. Mechanism indifferently treats the vital fact as same as the physical fact. The vital fact does not have a distinctive role of its own because it is presumably identical to the physical fact. On the contrary, vitalism stands for a self-identity of life. There are two different attitudes to define life: vitalism expresses an exigency of life within the living being while mechanism offers itself as a method to man for how to overcome his separation from life.​[43]​ This mechanization of life presumes the alienation between man and life. Mechanism holds that there is an explanation of the function of machines independent of the genesis of mechanism itself: “mechanism can account for everything except the production of mechanisms, whether they are natural or artificial.”​[44]​ The machine is characterized as given which is suitably applied to the organism: “to explain the structure and function of the organism on the basis of the structure and function of an already-constructed machine.”​[45]​ Viewed from the standpoint of mechanism, the originality of life is reduced to the rational calculation of machines but it is not a need to create. Mechanism does not create anything but it is “the implicit postulate of all usage of machines.”​[46]​ This method is a “ruse” that would nullify the living being at last.​[47]​

	Obviously, vitalism expresses a permanent requirement of life in the living being, so to speak, “life’s permanent distrust of the mechanization of life.”​[48]​ This life’s requirement aims “to put mechanism back into its place within life”.​[49]​ It is opposed to the tendency of mechanistic reduction of the originality of life. By contrast, “Vitalism simply recognizes the original aspect of the vital fact,”​[50]​ consisting in the spontaneous or self-positing and creating activity which can be recognized by intelligence in the living being.​[51]​ Compared to Bergson, Canguilhem does not impose a distinction between the virtual and the actual on the notion of vitality. The vitality of life is an activity of positing norms as Canguilhems suggests in The Normal and the Pathological (1943 & 1966), namely, “normativity”:

“We, on the other hand, think that the fact that a living man reacts to a lesion, infection, functional anarchy by means of a disease, expresses the fundamental fact that life is not indifferent to the conditions in which it is possible, that life is polarity and thereby even an unconscious position of value; in short, life is in fact a normative activity. Normative, in philosophy, means every judgment which evaluates or qualifies a fact in relation to a norm, but this mode of judgment is essentially subordinate to that which establishes norms. Normative, in the fullest sense of the word, is that which establishes norms.”​[52]​ 

This normative activity includes both producing the norms by life and for life itself, and also reproducing the norms as a reaction to the living milieu. The normative activity is conceived as a normative capacity that creates the norms in a certain milieus. The question how a living organism endures the changes is defined by a sense of the spatial either internal or external rather than that of the temporal in the case of Bergson’s duration. For example, the sickness is neither the absence of norms nor a quantitative difference from the normal status. It is rather another normative of life in another condition. ​[53]​ Life enters into the pathological status by means of obstacles, limits or pains in which we can feel a destructive experience in our body with another norm. In this sense, the constraint and challenge of life do not come from the confrontation of the spirit or psychological consciousness with matter. But they are originated from and completed by a capacity of body in its resistance to obstacles within or without body.

	Life is not something indifferent to the condition where it exists. It should not be reduced to an inert matter in a mechanical system which is indifferent to any possibility. If there is any intervention in the system, the inert matter reacts mechanically. The quantitative difference produced by this reaction is regulated according to the laws but not the norms. By contrast, life is a normative capacity of a living organism. It is against the reduction of life to the homogeneity of matter. It does not take on any mechanical reaction to the condition but it rather has an “affective experience” to the conditions what they have established: 

“We maintain that the life of the living being, were it that of an amoeba, recognizes the categories of health and disease only on the level of experience, which is primarily a test in the affective sense of the word, and not on the level of science.”​[54]​

Normativity is an “affectivity” including “affecting” and “affected”. This affectivity is a capacity of body that makes the qualitative difference in the tension between the acts of augmentation and diminution insofar as the living organism can invent the norms which are dependent on the relation that it lives with the condition.​[55]​ In this case, the sickness implies a certain value or a certain kind of differentiation. Life in the pathological experience performs “a spontaneous effort” which is “to struggle against that which obstructs is preservation and development taken as norms.”​[56]​ This can explain that why the normative activity of life is “the dynamic polarity of life” that “posits values”.​[57]​ This posit of value is an act of evaluation that creates a value to the normative activity of life, both in the environment and the organism itself. It does not aim to pursue the ideal or primal experience in terms of health and sickness. But it tries to reach the differences of the vital experiences by positing norms. Since the norm is immanent to life, initiated by its spontaneity, life is manifest in itself “being qualified,” “being polarized,” “being valued” and “being differentiated”. Life is a difference in itself.

IV. Two Different Approaches on Philosophy of Life

Bergson and Canguilhem have developed two different styles of philosophy of life based on a dualistic difference between life and matter. For Bergson, life always has a challenge to create and a constraint to continually satisfy the need of creation. Since life is an impetus to act on matter, it counters a tendency to become the inert matter, and it differentiates itself into divergent directions of plant, animal and man, into different forms of life from the simplicity to the complexity and from the species to the individuals. But there is a tension between “creating” and “created”. On the one hand, the élan vital is finite because it is confined to contingency, irreversibility, sickness and death. It has been given once for all and it never gives again. It is a repetitious force or effort to create without end. But it cannot overcome all obstacles.​[58]​ On the other hand, the élan vital is a dynamic force that creates in order to overcome what it has created in the living beings, although this force is limited by matter.​[59]​ But it has to overcome the material form of life. Otherwise, life would be equivalent to matter. For instance, man is a limited material form of life whose intelligence enables him to fabricate the new things to transcend his life in order to pursue the freedom of life from the necessity of matter. This is the human intelligence to overcome itself by itself. Life continues to overcome the created form until it is able to reach towards the higher form of life, namely, the life of spirit.

	Canguilhem is attentive to the role of vitalism in a philosophy of life. Strictly speaking, Canguilhem is not a metaphysician thinking a metaphysics of life. But his philosophy of life is not devoid of any metaphysical concern. At least, his vitalism assumes that there is something called “Life” which is not identical to the living organism, and from which we derive different theories of science of life. But life presents its constraint and challenge immanent to the living organism that requires life to identify itself with itself in order to endure the changes of life. These constraint and challenge are continuously to be satisfied with the self-positing activity of norms in the living conditions. In fact, this normative activity as an act of evaluation is determined by the difference of affectivity.​[60]​ By exploring this affective difference, life should no longer be conceived as an identical and idealized object to be analyzed without its spontaneity of positing values in differences. The distinction between the health and the sickness is determined by an evaluation of the subjective and affective experience rather than an objective analysis of types, namely, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of affectivity. Both of these two states are values and differences in tension instead of two different idealizations of two different experiences. They are variations resistant to any determinations. In short, the evaluation is an affective experience of life that allows us to account for the value of reason imposing on life. 
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